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1

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 16, 2016, at 2:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as

3

may be heard in the courtroom of the Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Court for

4

the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, Plaintiffs Patrick Kenny, Jennifer

5

Patrick, Dao Phong, Daniel Pipkin, Ryan McKeen, Leron Levy, Luke Szulczewski, Michael Allan,

6

Gary Cribbs, Bobby Cline, Shawn Grisham, Mark Laning, Clarissa Portales, Eric Thomas, Douglas

7

White, Brian Sandstrom, and Colleen Fischer will and hereby do move the Court, pursuant to

8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), for an order:

9
10

1.

Preliminarily approving the Settlement they have reached on a nationwide basis

with all Defendants in this matter;

11

2.

Granting provisional certification of the Settlement Class, and appointing the

12

foregoing Named Plaintiffs as class representatives and Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and

13

Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP as Class Counsel;

14
15

3.

Approving the Parties’ proposed Notice Program, as set forth in the Settlement

Agreement, and directing notice of the proposed Settlement to the Settlement Class;

16

4.

Appointing Gilardi & Co. LLC (“Gilardi”) as the Settlement Administrator, and

17

directing Gilardi to carry out the duties of the Settlement Administrator, including but not limited

18

to the provision of notice, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement;

19

5.

Approving the Parties’ proposed Claim Form, and approving the procedures set

20

forth in the Settlement Agreement for Class Members to submit claims, exclude themselves from

21

the Settlement Class, and object to the Settlement;

22

6.

Setting a schedule for the final approval process and for Plaintiffs’ motion for

23

service awards to Named Plaintiffs (and one former Named Plaintiff) and attorneys’ fees and costs;

24

and

25
26

7.

Staying all non-settlement-related proceedings in the this case pending final

approval of the proposed Settlement.

27

The grounds for this motion are that the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and

28

reasonable, and that the other requested relief is well-grounded in law and fact, as set forth in the
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1

attached memorandum. This motion is based on the Declarations of Robert F. Lopez and Daniel L.

2

Warshaw submitted herewith, with exhibits; the Declaration of Alan Vasquez, a representative of

3

the proposed Settlement Administrator, with exhibits; the attached memorandum in support of

4

Plaintiffs’ motion; the pleadings and papers on file in this action; and the oral argument of counsel,

5

if any, presented at the hearing on this motion.

6

Dated: January 22, 2016.
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP

7
8

By

14

/s/ Steve W. Berman
Steve W. Berman
Steve W. Berman (pro hac vice)
Robert F. Lopez (pro hac vice)
1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 623-7292
Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
steve@hbsslaw.com
robl@hbsslaw.com

15

PEARSON SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP

9
10
11
12
13

16
By

/s/ Daniel L. Warshaw
Daniel L. Warshaw
Bruce L. Simon (96241)
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 2450
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 433-9000
Facsimile: (415) 433-9008
bsimon@pswlaw.com

17
18
19
20
21
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15165 Ventura Blvd., Suite 400
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1

I.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This matter concerns Carrier iQ Software, a product that millions of U.S. mobile devices

3

have borne over the years. Some, including the Defendants in this case, tout its abilities to aid

4

wireless carriers in providing better service to their customers by, for example, helping to

5

determine the cause of dropped calls. But to consumers’ surprise and dismay, based on video-

6

taped demonstrations and news reports in the technical and mainstream press that broke toward the

7

end of 2011, the software seemed also to enable the interception and unauthorized re-transmittal of

8

private electronic communications and data to unintended recipients. Following the dissemination

9

of these demonstrations and reports, consumers with Carrier iQ-equipped mobile phones filed 70-

10

plus lawsuits, including against the Defendants, in courts around the country. These suits

11

ultimately were consolidated by the J.P.M.L. for coordinated pretrial proceedings before this Court.

12

Throughout the pendency of this case, the Defendants have adamantly denied liability,

13

variously arguing that the software at issue is benign; that Plaintiffs misunderstood what they were

14

seeing; that Plaintiffs authorized use of the software; and that in other instances, certain activity

15

was inadvertent (and therefore unactionable) and had caused no harm. The Defendants also

16

contended that in any event, Plaintiffs could not sue them in court because of arbitration provisions

17

in the Plaintiffs’ contracts with their wireless carriers that the Defendants claimed the right to

18

invoke.

19

Since consolidation, the Parties have litigated this matter vigorously, and now, following

20

intense and lengthy negotiations, including five all-day, in-person mediation sessions, the Parties

21

have reached a nationwide Settlement of Plaintiffs’ claims. The Parties’ hard-fought Agreement,

22

which includes a $9 million cash component, provides qualified Class Members presumptively

23

with pro-rated cash awards via a simple claims process, or, if the Settlement fund is over-

24

subscribed, donations to established guardians of privacy interests for the benefit of Class

25

Members. It also provides for injunctive relief that Defendant Carrier iQ, Inc. implemented prior

26

to the recent acquisition of its assets by AT&T Mobility IP, LLC.

27
28

Regarding notice, the Parties have agreed to a strong, multi-faceted publication program
constructed with expert assistance for maximum reach. The Notice Program, designed to effect the
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1

best notice practicable under the circumstances, includes print and intensive, targeted Internet

2

advertising components; a dedicated Settlement website; references to that website on the websites

3

of proposed Class Counsel; and a joint press release. As such, it comports with the law and due

4

process.

5

As Plaintiffs demonstrate below, the Parties’ Settlement is worthy of the Court’s assent.

6

Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for: preliminary approval of the Parties’ compromise

7

Agreement; provisional certification of the requested nationwide Settlement Class, appointment of

8

the Named Plaintiffs as class representatives, and appointment of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro

9

LLP and Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP as Class Counsel; approval of the Parties’ Notice

10

Program and an order directing notice accordingly; approval of Gilardi & Co. LLP as Settlement

11

Administrator, whose duties shall include, inter alia, the provision of notice as directed; approval

12

of the Parties’ proposed claim form, and approval of the procedures set forth in the Settlement

13

Agreement for Class Members to submit claims, exclude themselves from the Settlement Class,

14

and, if any so choose, to object to the Settlement; and a schedule for the final approval process and

15

for Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.

16
17

II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

Should the Court preliminarily approve the Parties’ nationwide settlement, which followed

18

key discovery, expert consultation, litigation, and intense negotiations, including five in-person

19

mediations in which the Parties were represented by well-experienced counsel and aided by a retired

20

federal magistrate judge, the Hon. James Larson, and which provides to a nationwide class valuable

21

monetary and injunctive benefits following implementation of a comprehensive Notice Program?

22

Further, should the Court provisionally certify a Settlement Class so that notice of the

23

Settlement may be given to Class Members; should it order notice as proposed by the Parties;

24

should it provisionally appoint the Named Plaintiffs as class representatives; should it provisionally

25

appoint the Hagens Berman and Pearson Simon Warshaw firms as Class Counsel; should it

26

approve Gilardi & Co. LLP as Settlement Administrator, whose duties include the provision of

27

notice; should it approve the Parties’ proposed Claim Form, and approve of the procedures set forth

28

in the Settlement Agreement for Class Members to submit claims, exclude themselves from the
NOTICE OF MOT. AND MOT. FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL – 2
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1

Settlement Class, and, if any so choose, to object to the Settlement; and should it schedule a

2

hearing on the question of final approval of the Parties’ Settlement as well as a motion for recovery

3

of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses?

4
5

III.
A.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Background facts

6

In November 2011 news broke in the technical and mainstream press regarding the

7

presence of Carrier iQ software and its apparent activity on mobile devices. (Second Consolidated

8

Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 291) (“SCAC”),1 ¶ 40.) These reports centered on research and

9

Internet videos published by an independent security researcher named Trevor Eckhart. (Id., ¶ 41.)

10

Mr. Eckhart’s YouTube video, which to-date has received over 2 million views, focused on his

11

HTC mobile telephone. (Id., ¶ 46.) His video appeared to show troubling activity associated with

12

Carrier iQ Software on his device, including the interception and logging of SMS text message

13

content and Internet search terms, among other communications. (Id.)
Concerns arose that the content of consumers’ private electronic communications was being

14
15

captured and transmitted off users’ devices to unintended third-party recipients. (Id., ¶ 47.) Soon

16

Congress, particularly U.S. Sen. Al Franken, became involved. (Id., ¶ 48.) On December 1, 2011,

17

Sen. Franken sent letters to Carrier iQ, certain wireless carriers, and three of the device

18

manufacturers that are Defendants here. (Id.) All had responded by the end of that year, providing

19

more insight into the design and workings of Carrier iQ Software. (Id., ¶¶ 52-60.)

20

B.

Plaintiffs’ claims

21

By the end of 2011, consumers around the country had filed 70-plus proposed class-action

22

suits, in multiple jurisdictions, against Carrier iQ and several device manufacturers. In April 2012

23
24
25
26
27
28

1

Citations in this motion are largely to Plaintiffs’ SCAC. On January 22, 2016, Plaintiffs filed
their Third Consolidated Amended Complaint, which, as permitted by the Court in its order on
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 339 (“MTD Order”), includes an amended Federal
Wiretap Act (sometimes “FWA”) claim. As Plaintiffs have advised Defendants, they did not at
this time amend or re-plead in the other manners permitted by the Court’s MTD Order, or to
account for other claims dismissed with or without prejudice in that order. If Plaintiffs’ Settlement
with the Defendants is not finally approved, or if it is otherwise terminated, respectfully, Plaintiffs
will submit a further amended complaint taking into account all aspects of the Court’s MTD Order,
including other claims dismissed and the Court’s leave to amend and re-plead as specified therein.
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1

the J.P.M.L. consolidated all of the federal suits in the Northern District of California and appointed

2

the Hon. Edward M. Chen as the MDL judge. In August 2012, Plaintiffs in the MDL proceedings,

3

who hail from 13 states, filed their First Consolidated Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 107, alleging

4

six counts against the instant Defendants. They dropped one of these counts in their June 2014

5

Second Consolidated Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 291.) And, earlier on the date of the instant

6

motion, Plaintiffs filed their Third Consolidated Amended Complaint, in which they amend and re-

7

assert their Federal Wiretap Act claim against the Manufacturer Defendants.2 The Court had

8

dismissed this claim without prejudice in January 2015, as discussed below. (See MTD Order at 41-

9

45.)

10

C.

Proceedings to-date
Following the filing of Plaintiffs’ FCAC, the Parties exchanged initial disclosures in

11
12

September 2012.

13

Thereafter, in November 2012, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. (Dkt. No.

14

129.) Each Defendant (except for Motorola) sought to invoke the arbitration provisions in

15

Plaintiffs’ contracts with their wireless carriers AT&T, Cricket, and Sprint on a theory of equitable

16

estoppel. (See generally id.)

17

The Court allowed arbitration-related discovery, which was contentious but productive. In

18

addition to serving discovery on all moving Defendants, Plaintiffs sought discovery from their

19

wireless carriers, as well as from Google. (See Declaration of Robert F. Lopez in Support of Motion

20

for Preliminary Approval (“Lopez Decl.”), ¶ 4.) Discovery proceedings involved motions to compel

21

and follow-up efforts, including a detail-oriented, in-person meeting among counsel for all the

22

Parties, designed to lessen the claimed undue burden on Defendants and third-parties. (Id., ¶ 5.)

23

Ultimately, all targets produced material to the Plaintiffs, the total of which was voluminous, and

24

counsel reviewed and analyzed it with advice from their consultants. (Id.)

25
26
27
28

2

See n.1, supra.
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1

In February 2014, following the completion of arbitration-related discovery, briefing on

2

Defendants’ motion was completed. Following a lengthy and in-depth hearing, the Court, on

3

March 28, 2014, denied Defendants’ motion. (Dkt. No. 251.)

4

On April 28, 2014, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal with respect to the order denying their

5

motion to compel arbitration. (Dkt. No. 261.) Defendants then moved the Court for a stay pending

6

disposition of their appeal. Following briefing and a hearing, the Court on June 13, 2014, denied

7

Defendants’ motion to stay without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 285.) In January 2015, Defendants-

8

Appellants filed their 80-page opening brief. Further briefing on their appeal has been delayed by

9

agreement of the Parties pending the outcome of mediation and other settlement negotiations, but the

10
11

appeal remains pending. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 6.)
Following denial of their motion to stay, all Defendants in July 2014 moved to dismiss

12

Plaintiffs’ SCAC in its entirety. (Dkt. No. 304.) Briefing was completed in early September 2014,

13

Dkt. Nos. 309 and 311, and a hearing was held later that month. In January 2015, the Court issued

14

its order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion. (See generally MTD Order.)

15

Thereafter, the Parties agreed to private mediation. In advance of mediation, the Court

16

permitted Plaintiffs ADR-related discovery. Plaintiffs propounded written discovery to all

17

Defendants, and Plaintiffs’ counsel reviewed and analyzed the answers and material that

18

Defendants produced. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 7.)

19

In sum, during the pendency of this case, Interim Co-Lead Counsel have conferred with

20

consulting experts; conducted extensive factual and legal research; and reviewed and analyzed

21

discovery answers and responses, and documents, produced by the Defendants and by non-parties

22

Google, AT&T Mobility, Cricket, and Sprint. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 8; Declaration of Daniel L.

23

Warshaw in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval (“Warshaw Decl.”), ¶ 4.)

24

Additionally, Interim Co-Lead Counsel requested, and Defendant Carrier iQ provided,

25

information regarding Carrier iQ’s financial condition and its ability to satisfy a judgment in this

26

case, as well as its ability to contribute funds to settle this matter. Interim Co-Lead Counsel

27

reviewed and analyzed the financial data provided by Carrier iQ as part of the process of reaching

28

the instant settlement. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 9.)
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1

D.

The Settlement

2

1.

3

The Parties agreed to JAMS mediation before the Hon. James Larson (U.S.M.J. Ret.). The

Mediation

4

first all-day mediation occurred in San Francisco on November 12, 2014. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 10.)

5

Four more all-day sessions occurred in San Francisco on December 16, 2014; March 17, 2015;

6

April 27, 2015; and September 28, 2015. (Id.) These sessions were conducted with the aid of

7

mediation briefing prepared by the Parties, including briefing and analyses submitted on behalf of

8

the Plaintiffs, which was prepared by Interim Co-Lead Counsel. (Id.) Each mediation session was

9

contentious,and several went well beyond eight hours. (Id., ¶ 11.) Both sides held their ground,

10

with all Parties strongly insisting on the righteousness of their positions. (Id.) The Parties

11

continued their negotiations following each session, sometimes with the aid of Judge Larson. (Id.)

12

2.

13

Plaintiffs first reached terms of a proposed nationwide settlement with Defendant Carrier

14

Settlement class definition, class period, and claims period

iQ, and those Parties notified the Court of their agreement on November 3, 2014. (Dkt. No. 322.)

15

Plaintiffs and the remaining Defendants reached broad agreement on a proposed nationwide

16

settlement at their September 28, 2015, mediation session. They advised the Court of their

17

agreement on October 8, 2015. (Dkt. No. 391.)

18

The Parties’ Agreement defines the Settlement Class as follows:

19

All persons in the United States who, during the Class Period, purchased, owned, or
were an Authorized User of, any Covered Mobile Device.3

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

3

The Settlement Class definition in the Settlement Agreement differs slightly from the class
definition in the SCAC because it includes Authorized Users, i.e., users such as Plaintiffs Laning,
Phong, and Sandstrom, who, according to records submitted by Defendants in support of their
motion to compel arbitration, owned Carrier IQ-equipped mobile phones they were specifically
authorized to use on someone else’s account. (See Dkt. Nos. 132 (Cummings Decl.), ¶ 9
(addressing Plaintiff Laning) and 132-4 at 3; Dkt. No. 135 (Miller Decl.), ¶¶ 111-15 (addressing
Plaintiff Phong); Dkt. Nos. 135 (Miller Decl.), ¶¶ 35-39 (addressing Plaintiff Sandstrom) and 13515.) The Agreement defines “Authorized User” as “a person authorized by name on the Wireless
Provider account for a Covered Mobile Device during the class period. (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 2.d.)
Also, the Settlement Class definition in the Settlement Agreement does not explicitly reference the
embedded or pre-load methods of installation of Carrier IQ Software, cf. SCAC, ¶ 86, because
Class Members with both types of installation are eligible for relief under the Settlement.
The Settlement Class definition in the TCAC squares with the Settlement Class definition in the
Parties’ Settlement Agreement.
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1

(Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 2.oo.) The Class Period is defined as “that period of time between

2

December 1, 2007 and the date of entry of the Court’s order granting preliminary approval of the

3

Settlement.” (Id., ¶ 2.o.) The Agreement defines an Authorized User as “a person authorized by

4

name on the Wireless Provider account for a Covered Mobile Device during the Class Period.”4

5

(Id., ¶ 2.d.)
The Claims Period is defined as “that period of time that expires 60 days from the date of

6
7

Class Notice.” (Id., ¶ 2.i.)

8

3.

9

Based on discovery and analysis, Plaintiffs estimate the nationwide settlement class to

Relief to the settlement class

10

consist of some 79 million members. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 12.) The Settlement provides for a Gross

11

Settlement Fund of $9 million in monetary relief to the proposed settlement class. (Id., ¶ 13.)

12

Additionally, Carrier iQ agreed, prior to the acquisition of its assets by AT&T Mobility IP, LLC, to

13

provide certain injunctive relief to the proposed class. (Id.; Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶¶ 18-21.) As part

14

of the Settlement Agreement, Carrier iQ warrants that it performed as agreed prior to the asset sale.

15

(Id., ¶¶ 18 and 67.b.)

16

Interim Co-Lead Counsel, in consultation with Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, endorse

17

the value of this settlement. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 14; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 6.) So do all Named Plaintiffs.

18

(Lopez Decl., ¶ 14; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 6.)

19

The Settlement Agreement provides that proceeds payable to the class are net of: the cost of

20

notice and administration; service awards to 17 Named Plaintiffs and one former Named Plaintiff

21

(if approved); attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses as specified (if approved); and any taxes.

22

(Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶¶ 25-27.) Service awards and attorneys’ fees and costs are discussed at Sec.

23

D.5 of this memorandum, infra.

24
25
26
27
28

4

“Wireless Provider” means “AT&T Mobility, Cricket, Sprint, or T-Mobile.” (Id., ¶ 2.qq.)
“Covered Mobile Device” means “a telephone or tablet manufactured or marketed by any
Manufacturer Defendant that was equipped with Carrier IQ software at the time of sale to end users
of the Covered Mobile Device.” (Id., ¶ 2.q.)
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1

With respect to the funds directly available to Class Members, the proposed Settlement is

2

claims-made in nature. (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 28.) Class members may submit claims during the

3

Claims Period for a pro-rated share of the Net Settlement Fund. (Id.)

4

The Agreement provides that in the event the Net Settlement Fund is subscribed to the point

5

that qualified class-member claimants would receive less than approximately $4 per claimant, then,

6

after consultation among the Class Counsel and Defendants’ counsel, and after notice to, and

7

approval by, the Court, the entire Net Settlement Fund shall be donated in three equal shares to

8

three cy pres recipients with national reach and reputations – the Electronic Frontier Foundation

9

(“EFF”), the Center for Democracy and Technology, and CyLab Usable Privacy and Security

10

Laboratory at Carnegie Mellon University5 – each of which is an established guardian of, and

11

advocate for, consumer privacy interests such as those at stake in this litigation. (Id., ¶ 28; see also

12

Lopez Decl. Ex. B.) Notably, the EFF was involved in this matter from the outset; its counsel

13

represented Mr. Eckhart early on, and it did much work to help consumers, i.e., the proposed class,

14

understand Carrier iQ Software. (See SCAC, ¶¶ 43-45.)

15

The Agreement also provides that in the event the Net Settlement Fund is not over-

16

subscribed, then any leftover funds following payments to qualified claimants (e.g., the value of

17

uncashed checks), will be split among those three cy pres recipients. (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 32.)

18

4.

19

The Parties’ settlement provides for robust notice. (Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 7-8; Declaration of

20

Alan Vasquez Regarding Dissemination of Notice (“Vasquez Decl.”), ¶¶ 13-28 and Ex. 4.) Given

21

the size of the class; the fact that the Parties do not have access to direct contact information for

22

Class Members; the inability to obtain direct confirmation; and the projected cost to notify Class

23

Members directly even if direct contact information were available, the notice program upon which

24

the Parties have agreed, with expert assistance and endorsement, not only comports with due

25

process but is the best notice practicable under the circumstances. (Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)

Notice, opt-out procedures, and release

26
27
28

5

The Parties have not discussed the possibility of cy pres donations with any of these three
potential recipients, nor do the Parties suggest that any of these three potential recipients endorse
their Settlement.
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1

The proposed Notice Program calls for intensive Internet notice via banner ads and search-

2

related advertising, all selected and administered in consultation with Class Counsel by an expert

3

notice provider, Gilardi & Co. LLC, which the Parties propose as overall Settlement Administrator.

4

(Lopez Decl. Ex. A at Ex. B thereto; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 7.) Further, the Settlement Administrator

5

will establish a Settlement website, where notice of the Settlement and key documents will be

6

available, including the long- and short-form notices. (Warshaw Decl., ¶ 7; Vasquez Decl., ¶ 27

7

and Ex. 4.) Class counsel’s websites will include links to this website. (Warshaw Decl., ¶ 7;

8

Vasquez Decl., ¶ 27.) Also, the Parties will issue a joint press release advising of the Settlement.

9

(Warshaw Decl., ¶ 7; Vasquez Decl., ¶ 26 and Ex. 8.)

10

To reiterate, costs of notice will be paid from the $9 million Gross Settlement Fund. Prior

11

to the Final Approval Hearing, the Settlement Administrator will file an affidavit confirming that

12

notice has been provided as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and ordered by the Court.

13

(Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 38.)

14

The long-form notice describes the material terms of the Settlement and the procedures that

15

Class Members must follow in order to receive Settlement benefits. (Vasquez Decl. Ex. 4 at 3-4.)

16

The notice also describes the procedures for Class Members to exclude themselves from the

17

Settlement or to provide comments in support of or in objection to it. (Id. at 4-5.) Any Class

18

Member who wishes to be excluded from the Settlement need only opt-out by making a timely

19

request. (Id.) The procedures for opting-out are those commonly used in class-action settlements;

20

they are straightforward and plainly described in the class notice. The short-form notice provides a

21

summary of the foregoing. (Id. Ex. 4 (including short- and long-form notices).) Additionally, the

22

Settlement Agreement provides that if opt-outs exceed a confidential number, then any Defendant,

23

with the agreement of two other Defendants, will have the option to terminate the Settlement or to

24

continue under it with no variations to its terms. (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 51.)

25

If the Court grants final approval of the Settlement following notice, and after the period for

26

opt-out requests and objections expires, then all Class Members who have not excluded themselves

27

from the Settlement Class will be deemed to have released all covered claims, as defined in the

28

Settlement Agreement, against all Defendants. (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 53.)
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Service awards and attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses

1

5.

2

The Parties have agreed that each Named Plaintiff (and one former Named Plaintiff) will

3

receive, if Plaintiffs’ request is approved by the Court, an award of no more than $5,000 for his or

4

her service in this matter. (Id., ¶ 36.) Named Plaintiffs variously have assisted counsel with the

5

preparation of complaints in this matter; have consulted with counsel at various times throughout

6

the pendency of this case; have monitored the proceedings on their own behalf and on behalf of the

7

putative class; and have worked with counsel to prepare, review, and submit declarations in support

8

of their claims and those of the proposed class. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 15.) In addition, each worked with

9

Plaintiffs’ counsel in preparing initial disclosures. (Id.) Various Named Plaintiffs also have

10

consulted on more than one occasion with Interim Co-Lead Counsel, with Executive Committee

11

counsel, or with their own counsel (as requested by Interim Co-Lead Counsel) regarding the

12

proposed terms of the settlement. (Id.) Finally, with respect to relief, none of the Plaintiffs will

13

receive anything more from this Settlement than any other Class Member. Instead, he or she will

14

only be entitled to the same relief, subject to the same conditions, as any other Class Member. (Id.)
As for Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, the Parties addressed the recovery of

15
16

these following negotiation of the substantive terms of the proposed class Settlement. (Id., ¶ 16.)

17

Regarding attorneys’ fees specifically, the Parties have agreed that proposed Class Counsel may

18

request (and distribute) the Ninth Circuit benchmark of 25% of the Net Settlement Fund by way of

19

a separate motion to be filed prior to the Final Approval Hearing. (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 37.)

20
21
22

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Court should grant preliminary approval of the Parties’ negotiated Settlement.
Settlements are to be encouraged in class-action lawsuits. The Court, however, must

23

approve class settlements for them to become effective, and in so doing, it examines “whether a

24

proposed settlement is ‘fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.’” Burden v. SelectQuote Ins.

25

Servs., 2013 WL 1190634, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013) (citing Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d

26

938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1988)));

27

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Approval of a class-action settlement proceeds through two stages:

28

preliminary approval and final approval (with notice in-between). Because the settlement in this
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1

matter passes the standards set for this first step in the approval process, Plaintiffs ask the Court to

2

grant their request for preliminary approval.

3
4

By way of this motion, Plaintiffs respectfully urge that the Court take the first step in the
approval process and preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement.

5

1.

6

Negotiated settlements like the instant one are to be encouraged. As the Ninth Circuit has

Negotiated class-action settlements are desirable.

7

stated, “there is an overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation. This is particularly

8

true in class action suits….” Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing

9

Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976)); see also Churchill Village,

10

L.L.C. v. GE, 361 F.3d 566, 576 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Pacific Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378

11

(9th Cir. 1995). Settlement is desirable in class action suits because they are “an ever increasing

12

burden to so many federal courts and [] frequently present serious problems of management and

13

expense.” Van Bronkhorst, 529 F.2d at 950.

14

Additionally, courts should give “proper deference” to negotiated compromises. “[T]he

15

court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the

16

parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the

17

agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating

18

parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.”

19

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (quotations omitted); see also Chavez v. WIS Holding Corp., 2010 U.S.

20

Dist. LEXIS 56138, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 7, 2010) (“The Court gives weight to the parties’

21

judgment that the settlement is fair and reasonable.”) (citing In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d

22

373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995)).

23

2.

24

The first step toward effecting a proposed class-wide settlement is preliminary approval.

The Settlement meets the standards for preliminary approval.

25

See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 13.14, at 173 (4th ed. 2004)6 (“This [approval of a

26

settlement] usually involves a two-stage procedure. First, the judge reviews the proposal

27
28

6

Hereafter, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG.
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1

preliminarily to determine whether it is sufficient to warrant public notice and a hearing. If so, the

2

ﬁnal decision on approval is made after the hearing.”); see also id., § 21.632, at 320 (“Review of a

3

proposed class action settlement generally involves two hearings. First, counsel submit the

4

proposed terms of settlement and the judge makes a preliminary fairness evaluation….”) (footnote

5

omitted); Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.25, at 38-39 (4th ed.

6

2002) (discussing the two-step approval process).
At the preliminary approval stage, the Court asks whether “‘[1] the proposed settlement

7
8

appears to be the product of serious, informed, noncollusive negotiations, [2] has no obvious

9

deficiencies, [3] does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or

10

segments of the class, and [4] falls within the range of possible approval[7]….’” See, e.g., Burden,

11

2013 WL 1190634, at *3 (citing In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D.

12

Cal. 2007)). Put another way, the Court should “make a preliminary determination of the fairness,

13

reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms ….” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG.

14

§ 21.632.
Because a preliminary evaluation of the instant Settlement will reveal no “grounds to doubt

15
16

its fairness or other obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of class

17

representatives or segments of the class, or excessive compensation for attorneys,” and because the

18

settlement “appears to fall within the range of possible approval,” Plaintiffs submit that the

19

settlement passes this initial evaluation. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.25; see also In re

20

Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079-80. Accordingly, as demonstrated below, the

21

Court should grant preliminary approval.

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

7

Where, as here, the settlement was attained via “arms-length negotiations,” following
“meaningful discovery,” in which the Parties were represented by “experienced, capable” counsel,
the Court may afford to it “a presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness.” See, e.g.,
Arnold v. Arizona Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2006 WL 2168637, at *11 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2006) (citing
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2005); NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 11.41, at 90 (“There is usually a presumption of fairness when a proposed class
settlement, which was negotiated at arm’s length by counsel for the class, is presented for
approval.”).
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1
2

a.

The Settlement is the product of well-informed, vigorous, and thorough
arms’-length negotiation.

In contemplating preliminary approval, one of the Court’s duties is to ensure that “the

3
agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating
4

parties ….” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (internal quotes and citations omitted). As set forth above,

5
the settlement in this matter was achieved only after: consolidation of 70-plus lawsuits and an
6

investigation that resulted in Plaintiffs’ FCAC; key discovery, including arbitration-related

7
discovery not only from the Defendants but from third-party wireless carriers and Google, followed
8
later by ADR-related discovery; review and analysis of the documents, declarations, and
9
interrogatory answers produced, including with the aid of consulting experts; and much negotiation
10
with the aid of a retired federal magistrate judge, who conducted five all-day, in-person mediations
11
and additional follow-up calls with the Parties. (Lopez Decl., ¶¶ 2, 4-5, 7-8; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 4.)
12
Further, the Plaintiffs and proposed class in this matter were represented throughout by dedicated
13
counsel, including Interim Co-Lead Counsel and Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee members with
14
extensive experience in class-action and commercial litigation. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 17 and Ex. C;
15
Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 9-15 and Ex. B.)
16
17

Because of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ counsel were well-situated to evaluate the strength and
weakness of Plaintiffs’ case. Far from being the product of anything inappropriate, the Settlement

18
at issue is the result of long, hard-fought, adversarial work, such that it is worthy of preliminary
19
approval by the Court. Cf. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (no basis to disturb settlement where there
20
was no evidence suggesting that the settlement was negotiated in haste or in the absence of
21
information).
22
b.

The Settlement bears no obvious deficiencies.

23
Furthermore, the Settlement bears no obvious deficiencies. See Burden, 2013 WL
24
1190634, at *3. There are no patent defects that would preclude its approval by the Court, such
25
that notifying the class and proceeding to a formal fairness hearing would be a waste of time. See
26
27

NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.25 (referring to the Court’s inquiry as to, inter alia, “obvious
deficiencies”). Respectfully, an examination of the Settlement will reveal no apparent unfairness,

28
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1

and no “unduly preferential treatment of a class representative or segments of the Settlement Class,

2

or excessive compensation for attorneys.” See In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 2012

3

WL 5055810, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 2012) (“There are no grounds to doubt the fairness of the

4

Settlement, or any other obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of a class

5

representative or segments of the Settlement Class, or excessive compensation for attorneys.”).

6

To the contrary, the Settlement provides cash relief to qualified Class Members on a claims-

7

made, pro-rated basis. (Lopez Decl. Ex. A, ¶ 28.) Under the Parties’ Agreement, there is no

8

preferential treatment of Class Members or segments of the class. (See id.) All Class Members,

9

including class representatives, are treated equally. 8 (Id.) If, however, it becomes economically

10

unfeasible to distribute cash to qualified Class Members, the Agreement provides that, upon notice

11

to and after approval by the Court, funds will be distributed equally to three established cy pres

12

beneficiaries with national reach (corresponding to the nationwide character of the proposed class),

13

each of which has made advocating for consumer privacy in the electronic sphere a part of its

14

mission.9 (Id.; Lopez Decl. Ex. B.) As stated above, the proposed, contingent recipients would

15

include the EFF, which at the outset of this controversy played a key and vigorous role in this

16

matter on behalf of the very consumers who are proposed Class Members. (SCAC, ¶¶ 43-45.)

17
18
8

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

As for service awards of up to $5,000 for each of the Named Plaintiffs (and for one former
Named Plaintiff), such awards are supported by precedent and also by the attention that these
individuals have devoted to this matter, including, variously, by way of assisting with the drafting
of complaints, helping to prepare initial disclosures, preparing declarations with counsel in
opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, consulting with counsel during the course
of this litigation, monitoring the course of this case, and consulting with counsel regarding
proposed terms of settlement. See, e.g., Chao v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 2014 WL 4421308, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2014) (noting that $5,000 incentive awards to representative plaintiffs are
“presumptively reasonable” in this judicial district) (citing Jacobs v. California State Auto. Ass’n
Inter–Ins. Bureau, 2009 WL 3562871, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009)).
9
As the Ninth Circuit has stated:
The cy pres doctrine allows a court to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable
portions of a class action settlement fund to the “next best” class of beneficiaries.
Cy pres distributions must account for the nature of the plaintiffs’ law suit, the
objectives of the underlying statutes, and the interests of the silent class members,
including their geographic diversity.
Nachsin v. A.O.L., LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904
F.2d at 1307-08)).
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1

To reiterate, cy pres distributions would only be requested here if, due to the number of

2

eligible claims, it would make no economic sense to distribute funds directly to Class Members.

3

Then the Net Settlement Fund would be distributed to institutions with a proven track record and

4

ability to advocate for the interests of consumers such as those who make up the proposed

5

settlement class in this case. (See Lopez Decl. Ex. B.) Courts have recognized that the inability to

6

award meaningful amounts in damages to class members justifies, in appropriate circumstances,

7

the use of cy pres to further the interests of the class. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona

8

Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (“when a class action

9

involves a large number of class members but only a small individual recovery, the cost of

10

separately proving and distributing each class member’s damages may so outweigh the potential

11

recovery that the class action becomes unfeasible …. [C]y pres distribution avoids these

12

difficulties …. Federal courts have frequently approved this remedy in the settlement of class

13

actions where the proof of individual claims would be burdensome or distribution of damages

14

costly.”); In re Netflix Privacy Litig., 2013 WL 1120801, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013)

15

(granting final approval to class settlement, including as to cy pres component, where plaintiffs had

16

“made a sufficient showing that the cost of distributing the settlement to the 62 million individual

17

class members would exceed the size of the fund, thus making such a remedy cost-prohibitive and

18

infeasible.”).10
Finally, as for attorneys’ fees, Plaintiffs’ recovery is capped at 25% of the Gross Settlement

19
20

Fund, i.e., at the Ninth Circuit’s benchmark for recovery in the class context. Negotiations over

21

attorneys’ fees were separate from, and took place after, negotiations regarding relief to the class.

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

10

See also In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2005) (“distribution
would have resulted in the payment of literally pennies to each of the millions of individuals who
would fall into the Looted Assets Class … [W]e have previously affirmed the District Court’s use
of a cy pres remedy in this case”); Bebchick v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.
1963) (impossibility of individual refunds for train and bus tickets led to the creation of a fund to
benefit transit riders); In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 323 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (cy pres allocation of $2.5 million where administrative costs of distributing it would reduce
payments to $2.00 per claimant); Boyle v. Giral, 820 A.2d 561, 569 (D.C. 2003) (in antitrust case
concerning vitamin products, court approved a cy pres remedy only award to organizations
promoting the health of District of Columbia residents where only $1 would have been available to
each class member).
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1

(Lopez Decl., ¶ 16.) The percentage negotiated for fees is fair in light of the years spent by counsel

2

on this matter, their experience, and the results achieved for the class. (See id.) In fact, it will

3

result in a negative multiplier to lodestar. (Warshaw Decl., ¶ 19.)

4

c.

The Settlement falls within the range of possible approval.

According to the Ninth Circuit, the Court should consider whether “the settlement, taken as

5
6

a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (internal

7

quotes and citations omitted). Still, the Court at this point does not conduct the fuller analysis that

8

occurs upon the motion for final approval. Chin v. RCN Corp., 2010 WL 1257583, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

9

Mar. 12, 2010) (“In fact, ‘a full fairness analysis is neither feasible nor appropriate’ when

10

evaluating a proposed settlement agreement for preliminary approval.”) (citation omitted). Here,

11

the Parties’ Settlement, which resulted in a $9 million Gross Settlement Fund in compromise of

12

hotly contested claims, falls within the range of possible approval, such that preliminary approval

13

is warranted. (See Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.)
“To evaluate the ‘range of possible approval’ criterion, which focuses on ‘substantive

14
15

fairness and adequacy,’ ‘courts primarily consider plaintiffs’ expected recovery balanced against

16

the value of the settlement offer.’” Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1114,

17

1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1080). In this

18

case, while certain evidence pointed in Plaintiffs’ view to violations of federal and state

19

wiretapping and privacy laws, violations of various states’ consumer fraud laws, and violation of

20

the implied warranty of merchantability, Plaintiffs’ success was not without doubt. (Lopez Decl.,

21

¶ 18.)

22

For example, the Plaintiffs faced another motion to dismiss with respect to the TCAC,

23

including as to their re-pled FWA claim against the Manufacturer Defendants. (Id.) Also, had this

24

Settlement not occurred, Plaintiffs would have amended as otherwise permitted by the Court, and

25

Plaintiffs almost certainly would have a further motion to dismiss as to most, if not all, of these re-

26

pled claims as well. (Id.) The Defendants would continue to have contested liability and damages,

27

and Plaintiffs had to take into account the financial condition of Defendant Carrier iQ. (Id.)

28
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1

Additionally, the Defendants promised to contest class certification on grounds that Plaintiffs

2

necessarily took seriously. (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs faced Defendants’ pending appeal. (Id.)

3

Still, at every stage of this case, Plaintiffs have pushed back, reminding the Defendants of

4

the strength of their own positions. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 19.) But ultimately, after taking into account

5

the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation, see Burden, 2013 WL

6

1190634, at *3 (citation omitted), Plaintiffs and their experienced counsel, with the aid of Judge

7

Larson, were able to achieve a settlement that allows for substantial monetary and injunctive relief

8

to the Settlement Class. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 19.)

9

With respect to the monetary component of the Settlement, $9 million is substantial in light

10

of the above-stated risks, together with the risk that, ultimately, a jury could find no liability or

11

award no damages, or less in damages, should the case have proceeded to trial. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 20;

12

Warshaw Decl., ¶ 6.) As for the non-monetary relief achieved, it included significant alterations to

13

the Carrier iQ Software, as well as changes to the porting guide to help prevent a debug error such

14

as that whose effects Mr. Eckhart pointed to in his widely seen video. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 20 and Ex.

15

A, ¶¶ 18-21.)

16

In sum, the Settlement at bar falls within the range of possible approval. For this reason,

17

too, the Court should grant preliminary approval.

18

B.

19

The proposed class should be certified for settlement purposes.
The Court has not yet granted class certification in this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask

20

that the Court certify provisionally a nationwide class for settlement purposes. Provisional

21

certification will permit notice of the proposed class to be issued to the class. Such notice will

22

inform Class Members of the existence and terms of the Settlement Agreement, of their right to be

23

heard regarding its fairness, of their right to opt-out, and of the date, time, and place of the fairness

24

hearing. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. §§ 21.632, 21.633. Here, where the Defendants have

25

waived their challenges to class certification for purposes of the Parties’ Settlement, Hanlon

26

provides the roadmap for the Court’s consideration of Plaintiffs’ request.

27
28
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1

1.

The proposed class meets the Amchem requirements for certification of a
settlement class.

2
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997), the Supreme Court of the
3
United States confirmed the propriety, and recognized the necessity, of Settlement Class
4
certification in matters such as this one, where Class Members are identifiable, and where there are
5
relatively small economic damages. As the court put it:
6
7
8

[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem
by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.

9
Id. at 617 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
10

Here, there is one underlying type of product at issue – software, an alleged course of

11
conduct common to all Class Members, and only economic damages at stake; thus, this is the kind
12
of class action endorsed in Amchem. Without this class action and settlement, most Class Members
13

would be “without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.” Id. In a situation

14
such as this, where the proposed class seeks only economic damages (as distinct a class or classes
15
seeking individualized personal injury and future-injury damages), class certification is eminently
16
proper. E.g., Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019-23.
17
2.
18
19

The Rule 23(a) requirements for numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy are met.

In order to merit class certification, Plaintiffs must show at the outset that the class is so

20

numerous that joinder is impracticable; questions of law or fact are common to the class; the claims

21

of the representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class; and the proposed class

22

representatives will protect the interests of the class fairly and adequately. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

23

Plaintiffs meet these prerequisites.

24

a.

Numerosity

25

Based on discovery, there may be some 79 million Class Members. (Lopez Decl., ¶ 12.)

26

On the basis of these numbers alone, “joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

27

23(a)(1). Given these large numbers, the requirement of numerosity is easily satisfied here. See,

28

e.g., Immigrant Assistance Project of the L.A. Cnty. Fed’n of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 869 (9th
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1

Cir. 2002) (noting that numerosity requirement has been satisfied in cases involving 39 class

2

members); NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.5 (“In light of prevailing precedent, the difficulty

3

inherent in joining as few as 40 class members should raise a presumption that joinder is

4

impracticable, and the plaintiff whose class is that large or larger should meet the test of Rule

5

23(a)(1) on that fact alone.”).

6

b.

Commonality

7

As one court summarized recently:

8

Commonality requires the existence of questions of law or fact that are common to
the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality focuses on the relationship of
common facts and legal issues among class members. See, e.g., 1 William B.
Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:19 (5th ed. 2011). Courts construe this
requirement permissively. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.
1988). “All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule. The
existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a
common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the
class.” Id. In fact, it only takes one common question of fact or law shared between
proposed class members to satisfy commonality. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.

9
10
11
12
13

Marilley v. Bonham, 2012 WL 851182, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012). The requirement of
14

commonality is satisfied by Plaintiffs’ allegations.

15
Among the common questions raised are whether the Defendants violated the Federal
16
17

Wiretap Act and various state privacy laws via the Carrier iQ software installed on Plaintiffs’ and
proposed Class Members’ mobile devices; whether the Defendants violated state consumer fraud

18
laws in the marketing and sale of mobile devices onto which Carrier iQ software was installed; and
19

whether any defect or defects in the Defendants’ products caused breaches of the implied warranty

20
of merchantability. (SCAC, ¶¶ 89.) The Ninth Circuit cited a list of common questions including
21
ones similar to these in Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2005), where it
22
found commonality. Plaintiffs have identified numerous questions of law and fact common to the
23
class, such that the requirement of commonality is met.
24
c.

Typicality

25
Typicality is met as well. Indeed, a finding of commonality ordinarily will satisfy the
26
requirement of typicality, too. Barefield v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 1987 WL 65054, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
27
Sept. 9, 1987).
28
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Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties be
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” [] “The purpose of the typicality
requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the
interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 408 (9th Cir.
1992).

1
2
3
4

Burden, 2013 WL 1190634, at *5 (citation omitted). Here, the interests of the Named Plaintiffs

5

and Class Members align neatly.

6

Plaintiffs have the same claims as members of the class they seek to represent, and they

7

must satisfy the same legal elements that Class Members must satisfy, including with respect to

8

their FWA claims as amended and re-pled in the TCAC. (See TCAC, ¶¶ 93-103.) They share

9

identical legal theories with putative Class Members, based on allegations that the Defendants

10

marketed and sold products that breached their privacy and that bore defects as identified by the

11

Plaintiffs. (SCAC, ¶¶ 61-74.) Their injuries are the same, too; like others in the proposed class,

12

Plaintiffs’ privacy was breached, or their data and communications left susceptible to breach,

13

leading to Plaintiffs’ claims for statutory damages, and also, they overpaid for products that

14

allegedly bore latent defects. (SCAC, ¶¶ 69-71, 139.) Thus, Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied.

15

d.

Adequacy

Finally, it must be determined whether Plaintiffs “will fairly and adequately represent the

16
17

interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “In making this determination, courts must

18

consider two questions: ‘(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest

19

with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action

20

vigorously on behalf of the class?’” Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1031

21

(9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs meet this requirement as well.

22

First, Plaintiffs’ claims are co-extensive with members of the putative class. All have an

23

identical interest in establishing the Defendants’ liability, and each has been injured in the same

24

manner. All assert the same legal claims, and all seek identical relief. There is no conflict among

25

them.

26

Also, each Named Plaintiff has agreed to assume the responsibility of representing the

27

class, and each has made him- or herself available to do so, including by way of assisting with the

28

drafting of complaints, helping to prepare initial disclosures, preparing declarations with counsel in
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1

opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, consulting with counsel during the course

2

of this litigation, monitoring the course of this case, and consulting with counsel regarding

3

proposed terms of settlement. (See Lopez Decl., ¶ 15.)

4

Second, as discussed and referenced in the declarations of counsel and as illustrated in the

5

resumes attached thereto, Plaintiffs’ lawyers, including Interim Co-Lead (and proposed class)

6

counsel have extensive experience and expertise in prosecuting complex class actions, including

7

commercial, consumer, and product defect actions. (Lopez Decl., ¶¶ 16-17 and Ex. C; Warshaw

8

Decl., ¶¶ 9-15 and Ex. A.) Counsel have pursued this litigation vigorously, and they remain

9

committed to advancing and protecting the common interests of all members of the class. (Lopez

10

Decl., ¶ 17; Warshaw Decl., ¶ 19.)

11

Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied.11

12

3.

Common questions predominate, and a class action is the superior method to
adjudicate Class Members’ claims.

13
Once the prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) are satisfied, the Court must determine if one
14
of the subparts of Rule 23(b) is also satisfied. Here, Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied because questions
15
common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members,
16
and the class action device provides the best method for the fair and efficient resolution of Class
17
18

Members’ claims. Furthermore, the Defendants do not oppose provisional class certification for
the purpose of giving effect to the Parties’ Settlement. When addressing the propriety of class

19
certification, the Court should consider the fact that, in light of the Settlement, trial will now be
20

unnecessary, such that the manageability of the class for trial purposes is not relevant to the Court’s

21
inquiry. E.g., Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021-23.
22
a.
23
24
25

Common questions predominate.

Rule 23(b)(3) requires an examination of whether “questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members ….”
“When common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all

26
27
28

11

And, for the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs ask that they be appointed class
representatives for the requested class and that Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and Pearson,
Simon & Warshaw, LLP be appointed class counsel.
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1

members of the class in a single adjudication,” class treatment is justified. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of

2

Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund. v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001).

3

Even one issue of central importance to the case and common to all class member claims can cause

4

class litigation to be appropriate. Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (9th

5

Cir. 1996). Here, common questions predominate.
Common questions include whether Defendants’ software is a device used to intercept

6
7

communications in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act; whether the Defendants have violated the

8

privacy acts of various states as alleged in the operative complaint; whether the devices on which

9

the software is installed are defective, such that they violate the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty

10

act and state warranty law as alleged in the complaint; and whether the Defendants, by way of the

11

conduct alleged in the complaint, have violated the various state consumer fraud and protection

12

acts identified in the complaint.12 (SCAC, ¶ 89; TCAC, ¶ 89.) These numerous common questions

13

at the heart of this matter predominate over any issues affecting only individuals. Predominance is

14

established.

15

b.

16
17
18

Class treatment is the superior method for adjudicating claims of
members of the proposed Settlement Class.

As for the requirement in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) that the class action be “superior to other
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy,” class treatment will
facilitate the fair and efficient resolution of all putative Class Members’ claims. Given that

19
Plaintiffs are aware of millions of Class Members sharing common issues, the class device is the
20
most efficient and fair means of adjudicating all these many claims. Class treatment is far superior
21
to thousands upon thousands of individual suits or piecemeal litigation; in this matter, it will fulfill
22
its function of conserving scarce judicial resources and promoting the consistency of adjudication.
23
Accordingly, the superiority aspect of Rule 23(b)(3) is readily met.
24
25
26
27
28

12

These questions persist insofar as permitted by the Court in its MTD Order, and following
Plaintiffs’ amendment of the complaint to assert a revised FWA claim, as allowed by the Court.
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1

C.

The Court should approve the proposed forms and methods of class notice.
“Rule 23(e)(1)(B) requires the court to ‘direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class

2
3

members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise ….’”

4

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. § 21.312, at 293. In order to protect the rights of absent Class

5

Members, the Court must direct the best notice practicable to Class Members. See, e.g., Phillips

6

Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,

7

174-75 (1974).
Additionally, “Rule 23 … requires that individual notice in [opt-out] actions be given to

8
9

class members who can be identified through reasonable efforts. Those who cannot be readily

10

identified must be given the ‘best notice practicable under the circumstances.’” MANUAL FOR

11

COMPLEX LITIG. § 21.311, at 287. In this case, bearing in mind the large class size, Plaintiffs have

12

consulted with a notice expert to devise an intensive and best-notice-practicable Notice Program

13

including a strong Internet and print publication component to reach Class Members nationwide; a

14

settlement website; and plans to disseminate a press release regarding the settlement. (See Vasquez

15

Decl., ¶¶ 17-31 and Exs. 5-8; Warshaw Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.) Notice by publication is an acceptable

16

method of providing notice where, as here,13 the identity of specific Class Members is not

17

reasonably available, and where the class size is as large as it is here. In re Tableware Antitrust

18

Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. § 21.311); In re HP Laser

19

Printer Litig., 2011 WL 3861703, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011) (approving a notice plan

20

utilizing direct email notice, publication of the summary notice in print publications, banner

21

advertisements on websites, and “providing a link on both notice forms to a settlement website”);

22

Norflet v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 350, 352 (D. Conn. 2009) (approving a

23

notice plan utilizing Internet banner advertisements).

24

As for the settlement notice itself, it should:

25



define the class;

26



describe clearly the options open to class members and the deadlines for taking action;

27
28

13

See Warshaw Decl., ¶ 8.
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1



describe the essential terms of the proposed settlement;

3



disclose any special benefits provided to the class representatives;

4



provide information regarding attorney fees;

5



indicate the time and the place of the hearing to consider approval of the settlement, and
the method for objecting to or opting out of the settlement;

7



describe the method for objecting to or opting out of the settlement;

8



explain the procedures for allocating and distributing settlement funds and clearly set
forth any variations among different categories of class members;

10



explain the basis for valuation of non-monetary benefits;

11



provide information that will enable class members to estimate their individual
recoveries; and



prominently display the address and phone number of class counsel and how to make
inquiries.

2

6

9

12
13
14

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. § 21.312, at 295 (citation omitted). Here, the notice forms attached
15

to the Parties’ Settlement satisfy these requirements. (See Vasquez Decl. Ex. 4 (short- and long-

16
form notices).)
17
The Notice Program and documents are designed to afford notice in a comprehensive and
18
reasonable manner. Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to approve them.
19
20

D.

The Court should set a schedule toward final approval of the Parties’ Settlement.
If the Court grants preliminary approval and provisionally certifies the Settlement Class,

21

respectfully, the Court then should set a schedule toward final approval of the Parties’ Settlement.

22
The Plaintiffs request the following schedule, which is incorporated in the proposed order
23
submitted with this motion:
24
1.

The Notice Program shall commence no later than thirty-five (35) days after the
entry of this Order (“Class Notice Date”);

2.

Class Counsel’s application for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses shall be filed no
later than forty-five (45) days after the Class Notice Date;

25
26
27
28
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1

3.

Class Members shall have until sixty (60) days after the Class Notice Date to file
claims, opt-out, or exclude themselves, to object to the Stipulation of Settlement and
Release (“Stipulation”), or to respond to Class Counsel’s application for attorneys’
fees, costs, and expenses;

4.

Plaintiffs shall file their Motion for Final Approval no later than thirty-five (35)
days before the Final Approval Hearing;

5.

Plaintiff shall reply to any objection to the Stipulation and/or Class Counsel’s
application for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses no later than seven (7) days
before the Final Approval Hearing; and

6.

The Final Approval Hearing shall be held on a date no earlier than 145 days from
the date of the order granting preliminary approval.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

V.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs ask respectfully that the Court grant preliminary
approval of the Parties’ Settlement and the further relief requested herein.
Dated: January 22, 2016.
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